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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BOB BACKMAN and RHONDA
BACKMAN, husband and wife,
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JAMES A. SPAGON and LINDA I.
SPAGON, husband and wife; KENNETH
G. LLOYD and PRISCILLA I. LLOYD,
husband and wife; BRUCE JOHNSON
and DEBORAH JOHNSON, husband and
wife; THOMAS L. LAWRENCE and
DEBRA A. LAWRENCE, husband and
wife; KEVIN D. SCHRADER, a single
person; WESTON SCOTT MILLWARD, a
married man; and PEND OREILLE VIEW
ESTATES OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC,
an Idaho non-profit corporation,
GREGORY ZIRWES and THERESA
ZIRWES, husband and wife;
CHRISTOPHER BESSLER, an individual;
PATRICK McKENNA and MICHELLE
McKENNA, husband and wife, and
CHRISTOPHER E. GRANT and SUSAN R.
GRANT, husband and wife,
Respondents.
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1.

A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of Case

The I 0 0 acres purchased by Bob and Rhonda Backman in 2005 was a
part of thousands of acres of timberland owned by Humbird Lumber Company in
Bonner County between 1900 and 1948.' From its commencement, Humbird
Lumber Company put its lands on the market for sale as soon as they were cut
over. Tr., p. 680, L. 6 - 9.
The Backman 100 acres is steep, rocky and never had been used for any
purpose other than logging. This case was initiated and has been carried on
because the title insurance examiner in the Sandpoint office of Alliance Title
misread two recorded easements as providing access to the 100 acres when
they did not. Tr., p. 73, L. 20 -25; p. 74, L. 1 -7. Chicago Title Company issued
a title insurance policy dated January 22, 2005 to the Backmans in the amount of
$475,000 guaranteeing access by record to the 100 acres when there was no
deeded access. Tr., p. 97, L. 20 - 23. Defendants Exhibit Q. Chicago Title
Company had earlier issued a title insurance policy dated December 9, 2004 to
the Powers in the amount of $420,000 similarly guaranteeing access.
Defendants Exhibit D.
After finding that there was no access of record, title insurance counsel
acting on behalf of the Backmans filed suit on February 24, 2006 seeking access
upon other theories, all of which were rejected as lacking basis in fact and in law

' There are eight reported ldaho Supreme Court cases in which Humbird Lumber Company is a
party. Vol. 10, ldaho Digest, Table of Cases, p. 293.

by Judge Charles W. Hosack in two opinions. R., Vol. II, pp. 258 -299 and 370 375.
As of the date of acquisition of the 100 acres in Section 8 by the
Backmans, there were no recognizable roads in use to Section 8 from any of the
properties in Section 7 owned by any of the named respondents.

B.

Course of Proceedings

The course of proceedings set forth in the Appellants' Brief is
chronologically accurate. Respondents Spagon, et al will supplement as follows.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Robert and Lynn Walsh as defendants on
December 11,2006. The Backmans filed a Second Amended Complaint on
January 11,2007 adding Christopher and Susan Grant who had purchased the
Walsh property. R., Vol. I, pp. 113 - 122. Attorney Peter C. Erbland has
represented the Grants.
Respondents Spagon, et al joined by the Grants answered the Second
Amended Complaint asserting that none of the Backman theories were
supported by facts or law. R., Vol. I, pp. 91 - 97. An amended counterclaim
was filed on January 26,2007 seeking to enjoin the Backmans from any entry
upon any of the roads in Section 7 maintained and controlled by Pend Oreille
View Estates Association, Inc. (POVE) R., Vol. I, pp. 130 -142.
Appellants Spagon, et al and Grants rejected each of the Backman
theories.
1.
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The Backmans could not prove any road use by them or their
predecessors which was open and notorious or continuous and
uninterrupted or adverse under a claim of right or with actual or

imputed knowledge of the owners or for the five year period. None
of the five required elements of prescriptive use could be proven.
2.

In Cohen v. Larson, 123 ldaho 82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993), a
unanimous ldaho Supreme Court held that development of private
residences was not a public use so private condemnation was not
allowable under the ldaho Constitution and statutes. The use
sought by the Backmans was for private residences.

3.

The three necessary elements of easement by necessity, unity of
ownership, necessity at the time of severance and present great
necessity did not exist and could not be proven.

4.

There could not be any coupling of easements. The law does not
allow for such. There, in fact, were no easements in Section 7 to
Section 8 to couple on any theory.

R., Vol. [I, Ex. Post Trial Brief of Spagon, et al, October 2, 2007, pp. 6

- 18.

Appellants' Brief accurately summarizes Judge Hosack's post-trial actions.

B.

Statement of Facts

In 1890, when Idaho became a state, the human settlement in the
Panhandle was concentrated in the mining district in Shoshone County which
had been one of the first four counties created in the Washington Territory in
1861.'

Kootenai County, which included what are now Bonner, Boundary and

Benewah Counties, was created in 1881. The Northern Pacific Railroad reached
to Pend Oreilie Lake in 1882 with a branch to Coeur d'Alene described as "a city
of 200 or 3 0 0 in 1886.3

Arrington, Vol. I,HISTORY OF IDAHO, (1994), p. 426.
3@A

pp. 325 a n d 333.
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Leonard Arrington credits the continued expansion of the Northern Pacific
through Bonners Ferry and Sandpoint to Spokane in 1893 with the gradual
development of that area:
The railroad was responsible for much of the immigration into the
area north of Sandpoint in the 1890's and early years of the twentieth
century. 4

In 2006, Nancy Renk, one of the witnesses for respondents, had written a
report for the U.S. Army Corps of ~ngineers.' Humbird Lumber Company was
the early owner of the property acquired by the Backmans and the prior use of
that land is relevant.
In 1900, John P. Humbird, one of the partners of Frederick Weyerhaeuser,
created the Humbird Lumber Company and purchased the only substantial
sawmill in sandpoint.' The company immediately set off to purchase in several
separate transactions 159,051 acres mostly in what became Bonner County from
the Northern Pacific R a i l r ~ a d . ~
The company obtained other land in smaller parcels from individual
owners.' One of these transactions was the purchase on August 20, 1908 by
Humbird Lumber Company of the Backman 100 acres from Eimore McKenna
who had obtained a patent from the United States on October 23, 1907.'
Renk wrote that in the 1900 to 1930 period of time, Humbird like other
timber companies "was not designed to be a never-ending operative using
-,4di p. 334.
When the Lake Was A Millpond: Humbird Lumber Company and Its Sawmill at Sandpoint,
Idaho 1900 - 1948 (Hereafter Renk Report.)
6
Renk Report, pp. 5 - 6. Photocopies of pages cited are attached as Appendix A.
'Id. pp. 9 - 10.
8Id. p. 11.
'Gfendants Exhibits B and C.

sustainable yield practice in its forests" but instead sold the lands as soon as the
timber was cut.''
In the 1900's through the 1920's, roads in Bonner County were "fairly
minimal" and public roads even fewer and needing to be created by petition to
the county commissioners." The timber companies entered into cooperative
agreements for mutual uses of logging roads on their respective properties.'2
Judge Hosack recognized this mutual permission in his Memorandum
Opinion:
Given the number of land holdings in different ownerships
throughout vast tracts of timberland, mutual consent and neighborly
cooperation worked well. Logging operations pretty much was all
there was, and objections to log trucks by owners of high-end
residences located deep in the woods was not only unheard of, but
entirely inconceivable. As Larry Moody testified, "nobody ever
dreamed there would be homes up there ever."

R., Vol. II, pp. 277 - 278.
The Backman property ownership can be traced back of record to a grant
from the United States to McKenna in 1907. Defendants Exhibit G. In 1908,
Humbird Lumber Company acquired the Backman property in Section 8 and the
property owned at the time of filing the complaint in Section 7 by Millward, Walsh,
Lloyd, Johnson and Lawrence.
Humbird Lumber Company on December 22,1943 executed a deed
recorded January 8, 1945 to Lewis Modig to the SE I14 NE114 and E l l 2 SE114 in
Section 7 , Twp 57 North, R.2 WBM. Defendants Exhibit H. That is the property

10

Renk Report, p. 46.
Tr., p. 686, L. 14 - 19.
12
Tr., p. 688, L. 1 - 25; p. 685, L. 1- 23. Defendants Exhibit RR.
11
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owned at the time of filing of the complaint by Millward, Walsh, Lloyd, Johnson
and Lawrence.
On February 2, 1945, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed all of its
property in Bonner County to Eva A. wert.I3 Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. The deed
included the 120 acres Humbird Lumber owned in Section 8 which later became
the Backman 100 acres and the 20 acres purchased by respondent Kevin D.
Schrader. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. Also included in the conveyance was what was
described as "All of fractional Section 7 , Twp 57 North, Range 2 WBM."

This

description included the NE 114 NE 114 owned at the time this complaint was filed
by Rogers, Schrader, Spagon and two others not parties to this lawsuit.
Combining the deed to Modig (SE 114 NE 114 and E 112 SE 114) with the
deed to Wert (NE 114 NE 114) makes the total parcels conveyed away by
Humbird Lumber Company in 1943 and 1945 to constitute the E l l 2 NE114 and
E l l 2 SE114 in Section 7. This is the property starting with ownership by the
Spagons to the north continuing south to ownership by the Lawrences.
In 1943 and 1945, there were no roads in existence on the Backman
property or the Spagon to Lawrence properties. See 1939 Metsker Map,
Defendants Exhibit D attached as Appendix B.
As can be seen from the 1939 Metsker Map and from the deed to Eva A.
Wert, Humbird Lumber Company owned real property all over Bonner County on

13

Eva Wert was the sister of Jim Brown who owned Long Lake Lumber Company. Tr., p. 685, L.
11- 14. Long Lake Lumber Company later became Pack River Lumber Company. Tr.. p. 685,
L. 20 - 22.
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6

some of which were public roads. The E 112 NE114 and the El12 SE114, Section
7 did not touch upon a public road or upon any road at all.
From 1907 through 1945 and for many years thereafter the hills and
mountains in Bonner County had few houses. The state and federal lands and
most of the private lands, not in farms, were timber country. Skid roads were
adequate to remove the cut trees and haul them to the mills.
Randy Powers, who is a logger, acquired the 100 acres in Section 8 by
deed from Shamrock Investment on December 8, 1993. Defendants Exhibit G.
The only roads proven of record to have ever been used as access from
Section 7 into the Backman property in Section 8 were those punched through by
Randy Powers during his logging operation on that land beginning in December
of 1993 and lasting two years. Tr., p. 260, L. 4 - 13. Powers admitted that all
the property before he purchased in 1993 was wild and unenclosed. Tr., p. 256,
L. 19 - 21. Powers purchased his property as timber property. Tr., p. 257, L. 1 14.
The first road Powers made identified in trial as the lower road came off
Turtle Rock Road across what is now the Lloyd property to Syringa Creek which
had washed out whatever had passed for a road in a logging operation six years
earlier. Tr., p. 257, L. 6 - II ; p. 268, . 2 - 12. Powers could not get to his
property initially. Tr., p. 268, L. 14 - 16. Powers admitted that in 1993 the lower
road was "not a road in use." Tr., p. 268, L. 24 - 25.
Powers bulldozed a road across the creek into Section 8 and logged his
property from the lower road for a year into the winter of 1994. Tr., p. 269, L. 17 -

24.

Powers began logging off the middle road into Section 8 in July 1994, then

moved to the top. Tr., p. 226, L. 8 - 12; p. 294, L. 13- 18.
Powers finished his logging in 1996 using the upper road and taking his
logs out over Inspiration Way and Redtail Hawk Road. Tr., p. 279, L, 5 - 13.
Powers' logging operation was completed in 1996. He did not log again. After
Powers completed logging in 1996, he ". . . never was back with machinery." Tr.,
p. 281, L. 18-21.
The lower road was shut down by the Idaho Department of Lands in 1994
soon after it was opened. The middle road grew back and was not used by
Powers or anybody else after 1995.
Yellowstone Basin Properties purchased the property owned by most of
the respondents from Louisiana Pacific Corporation in 1994, had it surveyed,
created Pend Oreille View Estates Owners Association, Inc. (POVE) and in July
of 1996 recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
making all roads private. Defendants Exhibits A, B and C.
The roads within the POVE controlled property were constructed by
Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc. and Bluegreen Corporation of Montana after
the property was platted in 1994 into 20 + acre lots in a purchase from Louisiana
Pacific Corporation. Record of Survey, Gordon E. Sorenson.

Defendants

Exhibit A.
The roads created by the developer were named Turtle Rock, Redtail
Hawk and, leaving the POVE property, lnspiration Way. Turtle Rock Road starts
at an intersection with Baldy Mountain Road going in an easterly direction
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through properties owned by McKenna, Bessler and Lawrence and then turns
north through Lloyd and Johnson to terminate on the Millward and Walsh (Grant)
properties.
Redtail Hawk Road extends north from the intersection with Turtle Rock
Road through the Harris property and then becoming lnspiration Way through the
Spagon property.
The Spagons bought their property in April of 1999 and built a house. Tr.,
p. 265, L. 9 - 15. By that time, Turtle Rock Road as extended north into
Inspiration Way had been abandoned, overgrown and was not passable by an
automobile. Tr., p. 293, L. 24 - 256; p. 294, L. 1 - 25; p. 296, L. 1- 7.
The developers improved Redtail Hawk and Turtle Rock Road while
dividing the POVE property into 20 acre parcels. The C. C. and R's were
explicitly specific:

"..

Ziwes A:

.Said rights of way are private roads, maintained for the
use and benefit of the Tract Owners, their guests, and those
others entitled by legal instrument to the use of the same."

Reed Q:

And that private road situation, has that been regularly
followed?

Ziwes A:

Yes.

Tr., p. 453, L. 17 - 23. Defendants Exhibit B.
The PowersIBackman 100 acres at its base is approximately 2,600 feet in
elevation and at the top is approximately 3,600 feet. Plaintiffs Exhibit 43, p. 5.
Baldy Mountain Road at the Sandpoint Shooting Range is about 2,600 feet. The
horizontal difference between the north line of the Backman property and the
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south line measures on the 1966 map as approximately 4,000 feet. This equates
to a grade between 22" and 23". The close contour lines confirm the steepness.
On February 8, 1994 Powers had quitclaimed his 100 acres to his mother,
Kay McGhee, to protect against creditors. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. Mrs. McGhee
quitclaimed the 100 acres back to Randy Powers on May 10, 1995. Plaintiffs
Exhibit 13.
On the advice of Doug Ward, a broker operating Sundance Realty, a
warranty deed was prepared which Mrs. McGhee signed on December 3,2004.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 14. Parcel Ion the deed describes the 100 acres. Parcel 2
identifies certain recorded easements in Section 7.
Again on the advice of Doug Ward, Rapdy Powers presented the warranty
deed to Alliance Title and Escrow Company and asked for a title insurance policy
in the amount of $420,000 for property he had in fact owned since at least May 5,
1995. Tr.,p.404,L. 17-25;in405,L. 1-18.
The title examiner was perhaps misled by the easements described as
Parcel 2 on the December 3,2004 deed from Powers' mother, Kay McGhee.
The policy for $420,000 was issued on December 9,2004. Defendants
Exhibit 0.
On December 27,2004, Bob and Rhonda Backman signed a contract to
buy the Powers' property upon the representation by real estate salesman Doug
Ward that the title insurance would guarantee access and that in a hot real estate
market Bob Backman could turn the property over quickly at a much higher price.
Defendants Exhibit P. Tr., p. 67, L. 14 - 25.

On February 11,2005, Alliance Title and Escrow Company issued its title
policy in the amount of $475,000 which, by silence, guaranteed access and
within a month Bob Backman had two offers from buyers willing to pay in excess

-

of one million dollars. Tr., p. 80, L. 17 24.
In the summer of 2004 after he had decided to sell his property, Powers in
a one day operation clandestinely hauled in a bulldozer and cleared out the
middle road. When respondent Bruce Johnson discovered the trespass across
his property, he reported it to the sheriff and soon thereafter blocked off the
newly cut clearing. Tr., p. 622, L. 12 - 25; p. 623, L. I- 9; p. 625, L. 1 - 12. On
August 19, 2004 on behalf of POVE, a letter was sent to Powers charging him
with trespass. Defendants Exhibit U.
On April 18,2005 at the request of POVE, undersigned counsel Reed
wrote a letter to Doug Ward, the Backmans and the Powers advising that there
was no right to use the POVE roads. Defendants Exhibits V and W. Thereafter,
Backman quit paying Powers. Tr., p. 70, L. 12

- 17.

Respondent Greg Zirwes testified that he was road supervisor for POVE,
a part-time job involving a couple of hundred hours a year contracting and doing
work on the two roads. Tr., p. 454, L. 3 - 4, p. 456, L. 9 - 12. That task included
stopping strangers and advising them that they were on a private road. Tr., p.
465, L. 18 - 25,
Greg Zirwes gave several reasons why POVE opposed the Backman
development: invasion of community property, 16% grades which were twice

county fire standards; necessary widening that would cost $450,000. Tr, p. 463,

L. 9 - 19; p. 464, L. 8 - 23; p. 465, L. 2-9.
Theresa Zirwes, Secretary-Treasurer of POVE, confirmed the continuing
surveillance, and documented their enforcement to keep non-members including
Randy Powers off the roads. Tr., p. 562, L. 21 - 25; p. 563, L. 1 - 25; p. 564, L.

In her testimony, Theresa Zirwes went through a series of photographs
depicting the two roads starting with the "private road" sign at the entrance to
POVE controlled land. Tr., p. 565, L. 13 - 18. Defendants Exhibit EE.
Theresa described her opposition to the Backman intrusion: preservation
of the community; the very difficult, steep, narrow and difficult to handle roads.
Tr., p. 581, L. 1 - 25; p. 582, L. 1- 7.
Dr. Michael Folsom, expert witness for appellants, used blow up aerial
photos to speculate that there had been roads which he called "tracks" from
Section 7 into Section 8. Plaintiffs Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 44.
Richard Creed, P.E., who had worked for the Forest Service in the
Sandpoint area for 26 years and testified as an expert witness for respondents,
distinguished between "tracks" and "roads."
Erbland Q: Okay. The term "track" as it applies to road management, are
you familiar with that?
Creed A:

It is not a term that normally used in my experience in roads.
Tracks imply a couple of wheel marks or animal tracks,
whatever you would. A road is constructed as a road prism, it
has cut slope, back slope, fill slope. It has drainage.

Tr., p. 500, L. 9 -14.

BRIEF

Based on his long-time experience with timber companies, Richard Creed
corroborated the testimony of historian Nancy Renk that when the timber
properties were privately owned, the timber companies would allow access to
each others properties without actual recorded easements. Tr., p. 503, L. 21 25; p. 504, L. 1- II.It was Mr. Creed's opinion after travelling over all the roads

in issue that these roads would not meet applicable Bonner County road and fire
standards for the type of residential development that the Backmans and their
real estate agent, Doug Ward, had sought and advertised. Tr., p. 507, L. 21 25; p. 508, L. 1- 16. Defendants Exhibits T and GG.

Mr. Creed identified certain portions of the Turtle Rock Road, Redtail
Hawk Road and Inspiration Way Road as being too steep or too narrow or both
in violation of Bonner County fire codes and road standards for residential
construction. Tr., p. 507, L. 5 - 25; p. 508, L. I16.
Respondents' expert witness, Graydon Johnson, had been given copies of
Dr. Folsom aerial photos and exhibits and then obtained duplicate originals from
the United States Geological Service Office in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Tr., p.
636, L. 13 - 25; p. 637, L. 1- 9. Mr. Johnson's opinion, from viewing all the

photographs which he had obtained being most of those used by Dr. Folsom,
was that there was no support for the distinction Dr. Folsom had made between
"tracks" and "roads." Tr., p. 662, L. 22 - 25; p. 603, L. 1- 3:

. ..the information you can gather off of these photographs is too
ambiguous to really reach any concrete decisions on conclusions.

Tr., p. 663, L. 2 - 4.

Judge Hosack made an interesting observation in overruling the objection
of attorney Featherston to Mr. Johnson's opinions:

.

The Court: . . but it (Google aerial photo) shows this road or this
track or that everybody agrees is completely overgrown and washed
out and totally obliterated, and it is just as obvious on a Google site
as the road into the gun range. And having used Google before, I
don't trust it anv further than vou can throw it. So I don't think he is
telling us anything that is not;eadily obvious by looking at the
documents he has put in. And that's all he has really done. So I
think it just does to.the weight. And for that reason iwould overrule
the objection.
Tr., p. 668, L. 7 - 14.
Lannie Moody, testifying for respondents, had been a logger for 35 years.
Tr., p. 536, L. 2 - 3. Louis Modig, the grantee from Humbird Lumber Company in
1943, was Lannie Moody's grandfather.14
Lannie Moody and his family had logged the Backman property in 1975
Tr., p. 546, L. 2 - 22. What was created and used was:
Just a one-lane logging access only, steep, narrow, rocky, rough.
Tr., p. 542, L. 15 - 16.
Based on personal experience and clear recollection, Lannie Moody
dismissed the idea that any usable roads had ever been constructed, much less
used going from Section 7 into Section 8:
Reed Q:

And the road as it was originally located back in the 1970's
was straight up through here?

Moody A:

Straight up through here. It was not just a logging access.
Back in those days, roads were all built for the course of least
resistance, get in as cheap as you can and you know.

-

'4 The rest of the family changed names to "Moody," but Louis stuck with the Swedish "Modig."
Tr., p. 536, L. 20 - 24.
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Reed Q:

So all the area that you are talking about and all the roads that
were there were logging roads and nothing more than that?

Moody A:

Nothing more. Nobody ever dreamed there would be homes
up there ever, you know.

Tr., p. 543, L. 5 - 14.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Are the Memorandum Order, the oral ruling from the bench and

subsequent Order denying motion to amend and the Judgment entered by
District Judge Charles W. Hosack supported by substantial and competent
evidence and by statutory and appellate case authority?
Ill.

ARGUMENT

A.

Unity of Title cannot be Traced to United States.

The Brief of Appellants Backman leads in with an invitation to overrule
Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9,784 P.2d 339 (App. 1989). The prominence given
to this argument (pp. 10 - 17) reflects the weakness and lack of legal and factual
support for the remaining arguments.
Refusal to recognize common ownership in the original grantor, the
sovereign United States or the state, is solidly supported in the cases around the
country and in the texts:

The fact that all of the land was originally part of the public domain
and hence owned by a common grantor cannot confer the right from
which a way of necessity arises. Similarly, the doctrine of implied
reservation of a right-of-way by necessity is not applicable where the
unity of tltle on which it rests can be found only in the state.
25 AM. JUR.2d., Easements and Licenses, $33, p. 531.

To the same effect see Vol. 25A, CORPUS JURlS SECONDUM,
Easements, § I 12, Unity of Title, pp. 316 -317.
The annotation in "Unity of Title for Easement by Implication or Way of
Necessity," 94 A.L.R. 3d 503, 517 -518 (1979) cited in Roberts v. Swim, supra,
summarized the case law:

.

. .the

original ownership of lands by the public or state does
not provide the necessary unity of ownership to support a
subsequently arising way of necessity.
The A.L.R. supplement to this date includes Roberts v. Swim, but no
recent cases to the contrary.
In Idaho, all private property came originally from the United States.
Going back to the original federal grants to find easements by necessity without
any contemporary evidence would mean that every present day owner was
entitled to an easement across his or her neighbors' property to the nearest
present public road. There would be no need for a court ever to consider
prescriptive use easements.
The cases cited in the annotation are in line with the lead note. One in
particular, Guess v. Azar, 57 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1952), nailed the fundamental
problem with going back to the original sovereign grantors quoting JONES ON
EASEMENTS, page 247:
"It would be ruinous to establish the precedent contended for, since
by it every grantee from the earliest history of the State, and those
who succeed to his title, would have an implied right of way over all
surrounding and adjacent lands held under junior grants, even to the
utmost limits of the State."

There are other cases not mentioned in A.L.R. In Stafe v. Black Bros.,
297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927), the Texas Supreme Court cited two of the cases in
the annotation and then quoted from United States v. Rindge (D.C.), 208 F. 619:
"it is, in my judgment, very doubtful whether the doctrine of implied
ways of necessity has any application to grants from the general
government, under the public land laws. Pearne v. Coal Coke [Min. 81
Mfg.] Co., 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S.W. 402; Bully Hill C.M. 8 S. Co. v.
Bruson, 4 Cal. App. 180,87 P.237. It it exists at all, it can be invoked
against the government and its grantees as well as in their favor.
Hence every grantee of a portion of the public domain from the time
the land laws were extended over the same and those succeeding to
his title would have an implied right of way over the surrounding and
adjacent public lands, and a junior grant thereof if necessary to
reach his own land, and a junior grantee and his successors in
interest would have such a way over a prior grant under similar
circumstances simply because they derive title from a common
source."

297 S.W. at 218.
Easement cases are sitespecific. It appears from a cursory reading of
Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal. App. 4th796 (2002), cited by appellants, that the
dominant property in question had been a patented mining claim and the title
record made it evident that the original conveyance by the federal government of
the mine left no access way for the mining products to be brought out.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals guessing an intent 175 years ago
and its attempted distinction of the founding anti-sovereign law in California relied
on by the trial court, Billy Hill Cooper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Broom, 4 Cal.
App. 180, 87 P. 233 (1906), is unconvincing. Suffice to say that there is no
record in this case of any use being made of any roads in 1943 - 1945
comparable to the mining access found necessary in Kellogg v. Garcia

The other cases cited in Appellants' Brief do not lend weight or are
distinguishable. Kinscherffv. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (gthCir. 1978) is a
reversal of dismissal presumably on summary judgment on a claim based on
necessity. The Court of Appeals found factual disputes and cautiously
expressed ". . .no opinion as to whether such an easement here exists, nor its
extent." 586 P.2d at 161.
One of the cases cited in the Kinscherffopinion illustrates the limitations
on easement by necessity even where the claim is recognized against the
sovereign. In Superior Oil Company v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 (gthCir

1965),the issue was whether the oil company could use a road across lndian
country. The interpretation was of a patent from the federal government to the
Women's American Baptist Home Mission Society in 1910 with no subsequent
transfer.
The oil company wanted to move heavy equipment across the mission
land to a drill site. The Court recognized that an easement of necessity had been
granted but the use was not available for heavy construction equipment:
Certainly it cannot be said either that public policy demands or that
the Indians' trustee impliedly intended a grant of a way of access
across Indian lands greater in scope than was required for mission
purposes and whose greater scope was necessary only in order to
permit the granted lands to be used in a fashion adverse to the
interests of the lndians.

353 F.2d at 36.
State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995 (D.C. Utah, 1979) is the
exception that proves the rule. Again the interpretation was of original
government deed to property still held by the original grantee. The grant was

BRIEF

18

state trust land from the United States to the State of Utah made at statehood in
1894 with no subsequent change in ownership. The State leased the granted
school land to a mining company.
The mining company was denied access by the federal government
across adjoining federal laws. The Court recognized that the doctrine of
easement by necessity ". . . might not ordinarily apply in the context of a federal
land grant. . . ." 486 F.Supp. at 1005 (page 10). However an exception was
found for state school land grants:
Unless a right of access is inferred, the very purpose of the school
trust lands would fail. Without access the state could not develop
the trust lands in any fashion and they would become economically
worthless. This Congress did not intend.
486 F.Supp. at 1005 (p. 10).
All of the lands in Section 7 and Section 8 in this case came from railroad
grants, not school land grants.

1.

U.S. Supreme Court Denies Easement bv Necessity

In Utah v. Andrus, the Chief Judge Anderson noted the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,99 S.Ct. 103,59
L.Ed.2d 677 (1979) and found it to be "not apposite." 486 F.Supp. 1005 (p. 10).
That may or may not be an appropriate distinction.
However, Leo Sheep Co. is squarely supportive of Judge Hosack's
determination that original federal ownership will not support common ownership
to provide easement by necessity.
Easement by necessity was rejected even though it was sought by the
original grantor, federal government. Just as in this case, private ownership

began with a grant to the railroad, the Union Pacific. Chief Justice Rehnquist
opened his opinion with a learned discussion of the background to and the
culminating actions that lead to the Civil War railroad grant acts, in that instance
the Union Pacific Act of 1862. The following analysis which Chief Justice
Rehnquist subsequently describes as affecting "property rights in 150 million
acres of land in the Western United States. . ." begins:
This case is the modern legacy of these early grants. Petitioners, the
Leo Sheep Co., and the Palm Livestock Co., are the Union Pacific
Railroad's successors in fee to specific odd-numbered sections of
land in Carbon County, Wyoming.
59 L.3d 2d at 685.
In the present case, respondents Spagon et al and Grant, are successors
in interest to Louisiana Pacific corporation which acquired the property from the
Northern Pacific Railroad.
In Leo Sheep Co., the United States controlled the Seminoe Reservoir
which was used by the public for fishing and hunting. The railroad grants of
alternate sections left checkerboard squares so that access to the reservoir
crossed private properties used for livestock crossing. The federal government
cleared a dirt road across the private land and posted signs inviting the public to
use the road as a route to the reservoir. 59 L.Ed.2d at 685.
As here, there was no express easement. An 1878 opinion of Justice
Field was cited as noting:

. . .that the intent of Congress in making the Union Pacific grants was
clear: "It was to aid in the construction of the road by a gift of lands
along its route, without reservation of rights, except such as were
specifically mentioned. ."

..

Chief Justice Rehnquist then reviewed the doctrine of easement by
necessity as claimed by the government. He found two problems in the
government's assertion. The second is the distinction noted in the Utah case
that the sovereign state has the power of condemnation not applicable here.
The first problem, an equal barrier to the government claim and directly in
point, is this:
First of all, whatever right of passage a private landowner might
have, it is not at all clear that it would include the right to construct a
road for public access to a recreational area.

The opinion goes on to refuse to find an implied intent for a present day
road use that could not possibly have been contemplated at the time of the
original grant 100 years ago. 59 L.Ed 2d at 687. It was too far a reach for the
fictional implied intent to find that Congress in 1862 meant to include the right to
construct a road for public access to a recreational area a century later:
In footnote 15, the opinion discounts subsequent changes in the dominant
estate quoting from a New Jersey opinion:
"Changes in the dominant parcel's use exert some, but not a great
influence. i n determinina the scoae of such easements." 3 Powell,
supra n. 14,1416, pp. 34- 203 to'34 -204 (footnotes omitted). See,
e.g., Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Electric Co. 78 NJ Eq 434,
79 A 326 (1911) (footpath, not roadway, proper scope of easement
where use of dominant estate as clubhouse could not have been
contemplated by parties to original grant).

The exact same reasoning used by Chief Justice Rehnquist for a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court gives controlling guidance here to refuse to even
consider easement by necessity on federal land granted to the railroad.
Resource extraction, mining, lumber and farming, not residential development for
high-end houses on steep ground, was the contemplated use for the 150 million
acres of land in the Western United States granted to the railroads in the 1860's.
Judge Hosack quoted the testimony of Larry Moody speaking of the
Backman property as late as the 1990's:
"Nobody ever dreamed there would be homes up there ever."

R., Vol. II, p. 278.
2.

Wisconsin: Grantor Gave Away Access to his Property

In Schwab v. Timmons, 324 Wis. 2d 27,589 N.W.2d I(Wis. 1999) the
evidence established that the petitioners once had access to a public road on
land which they had earlier sold off. Therefor the landlocking of their property did
not result.

". . .from a grant of property to them but by their own acts in

conveying away their highway access":
An easement by necessity only exists where an owner sells a
landlocked parcel to another, in which case the law will recognize a
way of necessity in the grantee over the land retained by the grantor.
Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Ass'n v. Township o f Lake Mills, 195
Wis.2d 348, 372,536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Ludke, 87
Wis.2d at 229-30, 274 N.W.2d 641). The petitioners in this case are
the grantors, not the grantees, and as in Rock Lake Estates, the
conveyances which resulted in their landlocked property were made
by the petitioners when they sold off the property above the bluff.
We conclude that it would be contrary to this state's policy against
encumbrances for this court to award an easement to the petitioners
over parcels of unrelated third parties under these circumstances.

Although there were no adjoining public roads in 1943 and 1945, the
deeds have the same pattern here. Humbird Lumber Company sold off the tract
of land to Modig across which the Backmans are now seeking an easement by
necessity while retaining the 100 acres now owned by the Backmans. Plaintiffs
Exhibit 22. State policy in Idaho should be similar to Wisconsin in denying an
award of an easement over parcels of the unrelated third parties, the eleven
named respondents.
The Backmans acted prudently in obtaining title insurance and thereby
imposed upon Chicago Title and its agent, Alliance Title, the duty of search as
described in an earlier Wisconsin decision:
More recently in Kordecki v. Rizzo, 106 Wis.2d 713,719 n. 5, 317
N.W.2d 479 (1982), this court reiterated that a purchaser of real estate
has three sources of information from which to learn of rights to the
land he or she is about to purchase: (1) reviewing the chain of title;
(2) searching other public records that may reveal other nonrecorded rights, such as judgments or liens; and (3) inspecting the
land itself. These sources may be irrelevant under the petitioners'
proposal i f someone with a landlocked piece or property desired a
right-of-way through another person's property "in the interest of
development."
The petitioners are effectively asking this court to sanction hidden
easements. An easement which in this case was not created by, but
was, according to petitioners, clearly intended by the United States
at conveyance.

589 N.W.2d at pp. 7 - 8.
The Backmans have quite properly waived any claim to use of Redtail
Hawk Road under any theory. Appellants Brief, p. 22. The Backmans' claim is
solely and only of access from Turtle Rock Road in Section 7 into the Beckmans'
property in Section 8.
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As set forth above, there can be no claim of easement by necessity based
upon original ownership by the United States. The claim must be supported by
all of the elements of easements by necessity existing at the time Humbird
Lumber Company conveyed away its property.
3.

No Implied Easements in Loaqing Country

Before and at the time of the conveyance on December 22, 1943 to Modig
and on February 2,1945 to Wert, no part of the Humbird Lumber Company
property touched upon any public road nor upon any private road that connected
to a public road.
By deed dated December 22, 1943, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed
to Lewis Modig the SE % NE % (40 acres) and the E 1/2 SE % (80 acres) in
Section 7. Defendants Exhibit H. The 80 acres in Section 7 contiguous to the
west is now in the ownership of respondents Millward, Lloyd, Johnson and Grant.
By deed dated February 2,1945, Humbird Lumber Company conveyed to
Eva A. Wert the S % NW % and S 1/2 NW % NW % (100 acres) in Section 8
together with the rest of its property owned in Bonner County. Plaintiffs Exhibit
4. The 100 acres in Section 8 is now owned by appellants Backman.
From the time of the first patent from the United States to private
ownership in 1907 until well into the 1990's all of the properties of plaintiffs and
defendants were owned by lumber companies with the only use of the properties
being logging. These logging companies did not need easements nor did they
wish to grant easements. There was cooperation between the logging
companies and also with the few non-company private owners.

Permission was freely granted to allow logs to be hauled by horse, by
tractor, by skidder and finally by truck from the logging sites to the public road
and to the sawmills. All the properties were exactly as described by the Court of
Appeals in denying the plaintiffs' claim for an implied easement in Cordwell v.
Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (App. 1983):
The area where appellants' tracts are located in steep,
mountainous, forested country. The evidence shows that,
until appellants purchased their scattered tracts there was no
asserted need for year-round access to the area. None of the
old logging roads beyond Ole Ladd's dwelling were kept open
in the winter. With the exception of the Roush tract not at
issue in this appeal - none of the tracts has been occupied nor
improved.

-

105 ldaho at 82.

Since there is absolutely no evidence of any road in apparent continuous
use from Section 8 into Section 7 for a lengthy period prior to 1943, this type of
implied easement needs no further discussion.
B.

Backmans did not Prove Easement bv Necessity

The elements of easement by necessity were set forth in Bob Daniels &
Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535,681 P.2d I010 (App. 1984) as follows:
In contrast, an easement by necessity requires (1) unity of
ownership prior to division of the tract; (2) necessity of an
easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present
necessity for the easement.
106 ldaho at 542.
Repeated in B & J Development & Invesfments, Inc. v. Parsons, 126
Idaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, -(App. 1994).
Implied easement by necessity may be established where ". . . a tract of
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land is conveyed which is separated from the highway by other lands of the
grantor. . ." Burley Brick and Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 333,335,629
P.2d 1166, -(1981). The 120 acres in Section 8 did not touch upon a
public road or any discernable private road at the time of conveyance in 1945.
The 80 acres in Section 7 did not in 1943 touch upon a public or private
road nor does it now touch upon Baldy Mountain Road which is the nearest
public road. Turtle Rock Road, leaves the JohnsonlLloyd property, crosses
Lawrence, Bessler and Chitlender (not a party to this lawsuit) properties and then
onto City of Sandpoint property. These constitute four parcels of land never
owned by Humbird Lumber Company.
1.

No Easement Allowed Over Third P a m

The fiction of implied conveyance by necessity cannot be extended across
property never conveyed. This obvious fact and law was set forth by the
Montana Supreme Court in Woods v. Houle; 766 P.2D 250 (Mont. 1988).
In Graham v. Mack, supra, this Court, speaking of easements by way
of necessity, said:
There are two basic elements (1) unity of ownership; and, (2) strict
necessity. The necessity must exist at the time the unified tracts are
severed. (Citing authority.) The way granted must be over the
grantor's land and never over the land of a third party or stranger to
the title (citing authority) and finally there must be strict unity of
ownership." 699 P.2d at 596.

In Vol. 7, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, Second Edition (2006)
elaboration is made upon these elements:
Necessity. There must be a reasonable necessity for the right of way
sought by the creation of the easement by necessity. Most courts

will be quite strict in the degree of necessity they will demand,
stricter than with an easement implied by prior use. For an easement
by necessity, there must be "a genuine necessity; mere convenience
is not enough. "The easement must be "absolutely necessary;" it
must exist "in fact and not as a mere convenience."
360.03 (b) (5) (iii), p. 507.

The burden upon the one seeking easement by necessity is heavy:
Severance Leading to Lack o f Access. For an easement by necessity
to be implied, the severance creating the dominant and servient
tenement must have created a situation in which there was no
access for the dominant tenement to some public roadway.
The lack of access must be "the result" of the severance. The
necessity must exist at the time of the severance of the two estates;
it cannot arise later. Thus where landowners rendered their own
property landlocked by selling off their access, they could not claim
an easement by necessity over property from which their land was
originally carved out; their landlocked status resulted "not from a
grant of property to them but by their own acts in conveying away
their highway access." (Emphasis supplied).
THOMPSON $60.03 (b) (5) (iii), p. 507.
2.

No Necessity at Time of Convevance

There was no access from an established road across Section 7
into Section 8 in 1943 when Humbird conveyed to Modig, but even if there
had been, Humbird in conveying away Section 7 would have landlocked
Section 8. Subsequent owners of Section 8 cannot complain about what
the common grantor did. See Schwab v. Timmons, supra.
At the time Humbird Lumber Company conveyed its Section 7 property, it
was separated from the public road by property now owned by Ellis Smith and
then owned by his father. Tr., p. 102, L. 17 - 25; p. 103, L. 1 -7. Ellis Smith
described his property in the 1920's and 1930's as being wild country without any
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fences and with all the logging being done with horses with no automobiles using
the area until after World War I\. Tr., p. 119, L. 14 - 25; p. 120, L. 1 - 16.
The same result based on similar facts - no access to a public road at the
time of severance-- was the basis of denial of easement by necessity by the
Montana Supreme Court in Graham v. Mack, 699 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1984).
Special emphasis was given protecting the owners of property over which the
easement by necessity is sought:
Though the doctrine is new to this state, one of the common threads
running through the cases where it is at issue was stated most
recently in Goeres v. Lindeys, Inc. (Mont. 1980), 619 P.2d 1194,37 St.
Rep. 1846, where we explained:

"[Elach case must be examined after an examination of the
particular facts and circumstances. Additionally, any implied
negative easements as to a particular lot are to be considered
with extreme caution since an action results in depriving a
person of the use of his property by imposing a servitude
through mere implication." (Emphasis i n original.) 619 P.2d at
1197,37 St. Rep. at 1850.

Prior to the conveyance by deed to Lewis Modig on December 22, 1943,
Humbird Lumber Company did not have any direct access from the property to
any public road. The Humbird Lumber Company property and all of the
surrounding property was timberland. When logged, the access to the public
road was by temporary trespass or more likely permission from a neighbor which
was also logging its property.
In Blackwell v. Mayes County Ufility Services Aufhorify, 571 P.2d 435
(Okla. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed trial court denial of
easement by necessity:

We find that the court committed no error in so holding, for there
was no evidence introduced to show that at the time of the
conveyance by the remote grantor who severed the land into two
parcels, there was a need for an easement across defendant's land.

.

..*

Also, see Tiffany on Real Property (Third Edition) Section 794 in
which Professor Tiffany states:
"Since, we previously mentioned, the recognition of a way of
necessity is based on the intention imputed to the parties at the time
of the severance of the ownership, it follows that the existence of the
privilege, and also its extent, is to be determined with reference to
what is necessary for the use of the premises in the manner
contemplated by the parties at the time of such severance."
[Emphasis added and footnotes omitted].
See also, Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72,501 P.2d 1383 (1972) and
Hoover v. Smifh, 248 Ark. 443,451 S.W.2d 877 (1970).

The Nevada Supreme Court examined easement by necessity at length in
Jackson v. Nash, 866 P.2d 262 (Nev. 1993) citing inter alia to Bob Daniels &
Sons v. Weaver, supra.
The easement by necessity is created by a legal fiction --that the intent of
the grantor (never stated) was to convey or reserve an easement - but that legal
fiction must be based on fact -- that at the time of the grant the parcel granted or
retained had access upon a public roadway.
There should be a higher finding of necessity when the dominant estate is
the portion of the property retained:

One justification of that distinction is that the seller will be the one
with more sure knowledge of the existence of a pre-existing use and
the one with the duty to inform the buyer that the property being
purchased may be burdened with an easement. In order to burden
the purchaser this way and lessen the value of the property, these
courts will demand proof of strict necessity.
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THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra, $60.03 (b) (4) (i), pp. 494 495.
To sum up, unity of title in Humbird Lumber Company existed prior to and
in 1943. However, there was no access directly to a public road or by any
recognized easement in adjacent property to a public road on the entire property
in Section 7 and in Section 8 conveyed by Humbird Lumber Company in 1943
and 1945. See Metzger Map, Appendix 3. There was no reasonable necessity
at the times of conveyance. All of the property was timberland and access was
freely granted by permission for lumbering.
C.

Backmans Cannot Claim Private Condemnation

Bob Backman purchased the 100 acres from Randy Powers with the
intention of selling the property in 20 acre parcels for "nice custom homes." Tr.,
p. 52, L. 5 - 23. The Backmans acquired title to the 100 acres by warranty deed
on February 11, 2005. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. On July 12, 2005 using five
separate quitclaim deeds, the Backmans divided the property in five 20 acre
parcels. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16.
Acting for the Backmans, realtor Doug Ward created an advertisement for
sale of the property for $1,200,000 for residential purposes. Tr., p. 89, L. 21 - 25;
p. 90, L. 1- 18. Defendants Exhibit T.
The availability of private eminent domain for residential houses under
ldaho Code §§7-701 et seq has been barred since Cohen v. Larson, 125 ldaho
82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993) where the unanimous opinion concluded:
In light of this, we cannot accept the Cohen group's argument that
slightly expanded development of their lake side lot benefits the
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public of this state. The Cohen group's proposed development would
make available a maximum of seven new houses or condominiums
to already-designated private purchasers. This is not something
which is "necessary to the complete development of the material
resources of the state" as required by the Constitution. Nor has
such an activity ever been recognized as conferring a benefit on the
public sufficient to entitle a land owner to invoke the power of
eminent domain in order to facilitate its accomplishment.
125 ldaho at 85
As it happened, undersigned counsel Reed was the attorney for the
Cohens, et al and Judge Hosack was the attorney for Mae Larson. Judge
Hosack in this case has expanded upon and added considerable weight to the
Surpeme Court opinion of Justice Bistline. R., Vol. II, pp. 26 - 34.
All of the reported ldaho cases on private condemnation cited Appellants'
Brief (pp. 18 - 22), Cordwell v. Smith, 104 ldaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (App. 1983).
Erickson v. Amoth, 99 ldaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074 (1979), McKenney v. Anselmo,
91 ldaho 118,416 P.2d 509 (1966), MacCaskill v. Ebberf, 112 ldaho 1115,739
P.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1987) and Eisenbarfh v. Delp, 70 ldaho 266, 215 P.2d 812
(1950) were cited by undersigned counsel in Respondents' Brief and Brief on
Rehearing in Cohen v. Larson, supra. Justice Bistline for the ldaho Supreme
Court ignored them all and effectively terminated that remedy for exactly the kind
of residential development intended by the Backmans.
Appellants make no reference to Cohen v. Larson completely ignoring
this dispositive opinion. In Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 ldaho
123, 106 P. 3d 449 (2005), the ldaho Supreme Court, without citation to Cohen v.
Larson, rejected the proposition of condemnation to a private residence as a

reasonable alternative noting that "condemnation has been called an extraordinary power." 141 ldaho at 129.
In the ldaho Constitutional Convention, a major dispute arose about giving
those powers of eminent domain to private individuals and companies to obtain
easements across neighboring properties for railways, irrigation ditches and
roads. The debate is the subject of Chapter 4 "Eminent Domain and Private
Property" in Professor Dennis C. Colson's book, THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION:
THE TIE THAT BINDS, (1991), p. 62

- 72. The debate concludes with broad

power given to the mining, agricultural and timber industries. Colson, p. 72.
Article 1, Section 14 of the ldaho Constitution gave the authority to take
private property for public use for irrigation and mining purposes ". . or any other
use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the
state." The ldaho Supreme Court quickly determined that private condemnation
under the enabling statute, ldaho Code §§7-701 et seq. was available to timber
companies. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 ldaho 769,88 P. 426, 118 Am.
St. R. 233 (1906). Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 ldaho 556, 155
P. 680, 1919 Ann. Cas. 189 (191b).
1.

Private Residences are not Material Resources

For reasons often stated before and to be renewed, private condemnation
is not available for private residences. However, the constitutional debate must
be recognized with the enabling statute as providing a remedy for a landlocked
parcel of land when public policy recognized that landlock parcels needed access
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to develop industrial and agricultural resources of the state. In a footnote, Justice
Bistline clearly drew the line:

..

fn 3
.the construction of a few seasonal residences does not
ensure the 'ccompletedevelopment of the material resources of the state"
as this phrase was meant. We believe this provision in the Constitution
was meant to enable those seeking to develop valuable resources, such as
timber, minerals, or other products of natural resources, from being
thwarted by an inability to get access to these resources across the
property of another. The framers of our Constitution could not have
intended that private individuals wishing to facilitate access to their homes
should be able to condemn the land of their neighbors for this purpose.
125 ldaho at 85,

The remedy sought by the Backmans would require amending the ldaho
Constitution.
In Cohen v. Larson, plaintiffs were seeking private condemnation of an
existing road that had been in use for 32 years. The Larsons blocked the road in
the belief that certain of the named plaintiffs were intending to build second
custom homes for summertime residences on Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore.

In the first phase of the case, District Judge Haman had rejected plaintiffs
claim of prescriptive use accepting the Larsons' testimony that the road had been
constructed across their property with their permission which they now revoked
In the second phase under ldaho Code 37-701, the only burden to be imposed
on the Larsons, if plaintiff were successful, would be to open the gate.
The private road the Backmans sought coming off Turtle Rock Road
would be all new construction on respondents' property and, when finished,
would have required improvements in the POVE road estimated by Greg Zirwes

to cost $450,000. Even then according to the engineer Creed, Turtle Rock Road
would not meet Bonner County Road and fire standards.

D.

Backmans Failed to Prove anv of the Five Elements
of their Prescriptive Easement Claim

In Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 129 P. 3d. 1223 (2006)15, this Court
repeated the well established criteria for proving an easement by prescription:

In order to establish an easement bv ~rescriotion.a claimant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence use'of the subject property
that is (1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3)
adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or imputed
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory
period of five years. Hodgins, 139 ldaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973; see
I.C. 55-203. A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the
servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use,
by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Marshall,
130 ldaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. Indeed, the rule is well established
that no use can be considered adverse or ripen into a prescriptive
right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on
the rights of the owner. Simmons, 63 ldaho at 144,118 P.2d at 744.
142 ldaho at 480.
In Hodgins v. Sales, 135 ldaho 222, 76 P.3d 969 (2003), this Court
stressed the necessity of establishing all five of the elements by clear and
convincing evidence:

Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must make
findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a judgment on
appeal.
139 ldaho at 229.
The Backmans have limited their claim to Turtle Rock Road. This
eliminates the necessity of any discussion of use of Redtail Hawk and the upper
road during Powers logging operation which lasted two years. Tr., p. 260,
15

Cited in Appellants' Brief on seven different pages.
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1)

Open and notorious; and

2)

Continuous and Uninterrupted.

Randy Powers described Turtle Rock Road when he was using it in 1995
as having "eight or ten inch grass" with ruts that he needed to grade. Tr. p. 252,

L. 16-20; p. 257, L. 3-7.

Powers agreed that the property up to the time he

purchased it in 1993 ". . . was kind of wild, was unenclosed . . ." Tr., p. 256., L
19-21.
Powers use of Turtle Rock Road to access the lower road and the middle
road during his logging operation could be characterized as open and notorious.
After 1996, any use by Powers of Turtle Rock Road was no different than any
other member of the public.
After finishing logging, Powers ". . .never was back with equipment" Tr.,
p. 281, L. 20. For several years, Powers went up once a month for maybe eight
or nine months of the year to monitor stream run-off. Tr., p. 264, L. 13 - 25; p.
265, L 1- 19. He drove a four wheeler recreational vehicle that was no different
than the vehicles typically used by residents and members of the public. Tr., p.
272, L. 2 - 8.
Powers went hunting in the fall a couple of times a year, again, like so
many other people in Bonner County. Tr., p. 282, L. 23 - 25; p. 284, L. 1 - 13.
In all the years between 1996 and 2004, Powers went camping only once or
twice. Tr., p. 262, L. 4 - 13.

3)

Adverse and Under a Claim of Right.

Because others had used the road on timber production, Powers thought
he had a prescriptive easement. Tr., p. 258, L. 1- 20. Attorney Erbland asked
Powers if he knew the elements of a prescriptive easement and he answered
only "just usage, continued usage." Tr., p. 259, L. 3.
Asked about adverse and under a claim of right, this was Powers
response:
Erbland Q:

Well, if you had what you believed to be a right to use
those roads by prescription, why didn't you push the
issue?

Powers A:

Well, the road was still usable, you know, when they put
the rocks in. And Iwas just wanting to get along with
everybody.

Erbland Q:

And that is typically what you do, isn't it? You ask
landowners for permission and try to develop what I
think you said was a rapport with them to access their
property?

Powers A:

Yes.

Tr., p. 280, L. 17 - 25.
4)

With the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement.

Except for Dr. Lawrence who gave permission (Tr., p. 287, L. 1- - 14),
there were no houses on the property crossed by Turtle Rock Road. Tr., p. 287,
L. 15 - 17. Powers testified that he never saw anybody on the property during
the entire two years when he was logging or at any time thereafter until he sold
the property. Tr., p. 287, L. 1 - 25, p. 258, L. 1 - 13.
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In all the time Powers logged his property, he had never talked to anyone
on site:
Reed Q:

And there were no houses down here where we have the
property of Christopher Bessler are listed right down i n here.
In other words, going from the intersection of Turtle Rock
Road and Redtail to the Lawrence property, no one lived i n
this property?

Powers A:

Correct.

Reed Q:

Didn't see anyone there?

Powers A:

No.

Reed Q:

And there were no fences on the property?

Powers A:

Correct.
Tr., p. 288, L. 5 - 13.

The CC&Rs for POVE were created in 1996, but house building did not
start until 1999. Tr., p. 448, L. 24-25; p. 450, L. 4-1 1.
5)

For the statutory period.
Two years is not five years.

1

Common Use Rule Properly Applied

Judge Hosack determination that the use of Turtle Rock Road the
occasional connection into Section 8 for logging purposes prior to Powers'
purchase in 1994 was proper under the common use road theory.
All roads in Section 7 as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 41 derived from a pre1994 U.S.G.S. aerial photo including the connections Turtle Rock Road to the
north to Inspiration Way were for logging purposes.
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All the relevant lands in both Sections 7 and Section 8 were owned by
logging companies or loggers until Louisiana Pacific conveyed the POVE
property to Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc. in 1994 and Yellowstone Basin
had the property surveyed. Defendants, Exhibit A. Plaintiffs Exhibits 26, 27 and
28.
Appellants argument that there was no evidence of common use is
contradicted by the testimony of Lannie Moody based on first hand knowledge as
a logger and road builder in the area for 35 years. Tr., p. 536, L. 2 - 6. Mr.
Moody with his family logged the Backman property for W. I. Forest Products
Incorporated starting in 1975. Tr., p. 540, L. 4 - 9; p. 544, L. 13 - 15.
Mr. Moody testified to starting off Turtle Rock Road using an old spur
road, crossing Syringa Creek with a "punching culvert" onto a "one lane logging
access only, steep, narrow, rocky rough trail into the Backman property. Tr., p.
540, L. 2 - 25; p. 5421, L. 13 - 16. Mr. Moody identified this as what in trial was
the lower road. Tr., p. 541, 1. 2 - 4.
Lannie Moody's father had built a cabin on the Modig property in 1945
when he came back from World War II and Turtle Rock Road was access to that
cabin. Tr., p.544, L. 16-23. p. 545, L.7-12.
Dalyn Marley with her husband had acquired their property in 1991. Her
father-in-law had earlier obtained an easement from Louisiana Pacific which
owned all the property down to Baldy Mountain Road. Tr., p. 612, L. 21 - 28; p.
613 L. 1 - 5. The Marley access in 1991 and before was from the Baldy
Mountain public road onto Turtle Rock Road through the City of Sandpoint

Shooting Range to the junction in the west she had named Redtail Hawk Road.
Tr., p. 614, L. 21 -25; p. 615, L. 1- 9.
Turtle Rock Road had been constructed by a logging company at least as
early at 1975 and work that was done on Turtle Rock Road had been done by
the logging company owner and not by any owner of property in Section 8.
The only evidence on the record of a road being constructed from Section
7 into Section 8 is that connected with Lannie Moody's logging operation starting
in 1975. That operation was from property owned by the Moodys. The use of
that road was into Section 8, one not three intrusions, was minimal with
absolutely no impact or adverse effect on Turtle Rock Road on the Moody
property.
Use of Turtle Rock Road for the logging operation into Section 8 in 1975
and at all other times must ". . . be presumed to be by way of license or
permission." Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740,
(1941), Melendez v. Ninfz, 111 Idaho 401,404,724 P.2d 137, -(App. 1986).
2)

Powers Property was Wild and Unenclosed

Judge Hosack found that prior to the 1990's ". . .the relevant portions of
the Syringa Creek drainage consisted of wild and unenclosed land" Vol. II, R. p.
278. Appellants' witness Ellis Smith, still living in the same house, affirmed that
all of the property was wild and unenclosed. Tr., p. 120, L. 2 - 13.
Dalyn Marley testified that from the time they acquired their property in
1991 through moving into their house in 1997, Redtail Hawk Road was only a fire

access road. ". . .primitive, primitive not maintained by anyone." Tr., p. 612, L. 21

Judge Hosack found and concluded as follows:
Where the alleged prescriptive easement is over wild and
unenclosed land, there is a rebuttable presumption that the use of
the land is permissive. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225 (2003).
Because the land in question was essentially open to anyone, and
was freely and openly used by members of the general public; and
because a logging operation, in and of itself, and particularly in wild
and unenclosed timberlands, does not establish an adverse use;
there is insufficient evidence in this record of independent, decisive
acts indicating separate and exclusive use of Syringa Creek Road by
owners of the one-hundred twenty (120) acres in Section 8 sufficient
to rebut the presumption of permissive use.
R., Vol. II, p. 278.
The quotation from Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho at 79, cited in Appellants'
Brief at page 36 is followed by this law equally applicable in this case as it was in
Cordwell in denying defendants claim of easement by necessity:
A way of necessity arises from public policy considerations. It is, literally,
a creature of necessity. The necessity must exist at the time of the severance by
the common owner, and the person claiming such an easement must also show
there is present necessity for it

.

. . The trial court made no finding of necessity at the time of
severance.

-

When lands have been severed, the grantee or his successors in
interest cannot, by subdividing, create a new and different
"necessity" for rights-of-way, where no such necessity existed
before the severance. See 2 G. W. Thompson, Real Property, $373,
.398 (repl. 1980); Gulotta v. Triano, 125 Ariz. 144, 608 P.2d 81 (Ariz.
App. 1980); Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Or. 97,29 P. 268 (Or. 1982). A
remote grantee cannot create the necessity upon which he relies.

-
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105 ldaho at 79 - 80.
Appellants have failed to establish that they have a right to an easement
under four theories. Under easement by necessity or implied easement nor can
they properly claim private condemnation. The attempt to combine or couple will
not work because there is nothing to couple. To use the railroad analogy
appropriate to railroad lands, there cannot be any coupling because appellants
never put any easement cars on track. See Judge Hosack's disposition of the
coupling claim. R., Vol. I!, pp. 38 - 44.
E.

Respondents Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal

Attorneys' fees were not sought at the trial court level. However,
respondents are entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal if the
appeal only invites the appellate court to second guess the trial court. Hogg v,
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, -(2006). Gibson v. Ada
Counfy, 142 Idaho 746,761, 133 P.3d 1211, -(2006)
In Hughes v. Fisher, supra, this Court repeated the accepted rule on
appeal concerning facts found in trial:
On appeal, this Court will set aside findings of fact only if they are
clearly erroneous. Id.; I.R.C.P. Rule 52 (a). Thus, if a district court's
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though
conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb those findings.
Hodgins. 139 ldaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973. Also, this Court gives due
regard to the district court's special opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses who personally appear before the court.
142 ldaho at 179

- 180.

CONCLUSION

Unlike every reported appellate case in Idaho involving an easement
issue, the complaint in this case was not precipitated by a property owners' good
faith belief based upon on the ground observations and predecessors
recollection
that there was in fact a roadway or access to his or her property.
The complaint in this case was filed because Chicago Title Company had
erroneously issued two title policies guaranteeing access thereby creating an
exposure close to one million dollars. The named respondents, the Spagons,
Lloyds, Johnsons, Zirwes, McKennas, Grants and Wes Millward, Chris Bessler
and POVE were compelled to defend and counterclaim. These respondents all
lived upon and used roads that were designated as private of record, posted as
private and patrolled for privacy.
None of the named respondents had ever given any cause for the
Beckmans nor the title insurance representatives to believe that any right to a
road into Section 8 existed. To the contrary through POVE, written notice had
been given to Randy Powers that he had no right to bulldoze his way across the
Lloyd and Johnson properties across Syringa Creek into his property.
Defendants Exhibit U. Ten months before the complaint was filed, POVE had
notified Doug Ward and Bob Backman that there was no access and filed of
record in Bonner Couny the Declaration of Non-Access.
Chicago Title Company brought suit upon legal theories that were
explicitly excluded from coverage in the title insurance policies issued to Powers
and Backman:

B.

General Exceptions:

1.

Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the
public records.
Encroachments, overlaps, boundary line dispute, and any
other matters which would be disclosed by an accurate survey
or inspection of the premises including, but not limited to,
insufficient or impaired access or matters contradictory to any
survey plat shown by the public records.
Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public
records.

2.

3.

Defendants Exhibits 0 and Q.
District Judge Hosack listened carefully and then prepared a thorough and
detailed 41 page Memorandum Order. R., Vol. II, pp. 258 -299. Then Judge
Hosack elaborated on points not fully covered after oral argument on plaintiffs'
motion to amend. Tr., pp. 723

- 746.

R., Voi. II, pp. 370 - 375.

The judgment entered on January 2, 2008 denying all claims made by
appellants Backman and dismissing with prejudice the Second Amended
Complaint of the Backmans and cross-claims of cross-claimant ~chrader"must
be affirmed, and respondents Spagon, et al and Grant be awarded their costs
and attorney's fees as against appellants Backman.

Attorney for Respondents
Spagon, et al

16

Cross-claimant Schrader did not appeal.

APPENDIX A
RENK REPORT

When the Lalre Was A Millpond:
Ifumbird Lumber Company
and its Sawmill at Sandpoint, Idaho
1900-1948

Nancy P. Renlc
Plnme Creelc I-listorical Services
Sandpoint, Ida110

Figure 1. Jol~nA. Nambird, i~tldatedpiloto. Cor~rtesyof the Bonner C o ~ ~ ntlistorical
ty
Society
Museum Collections.

Weyerhaeuser, I-Iumbird, and other associates traveled to northern Idaho in October 1900.
They firs1 toured the Clearwater region where they had recently secured 40,000 acres.
Then Weyerhaeuser and his son Charles went north to Sandpoint where they met wit11
Norman Holter, acting manager of the Sand Point Lumber Co. On a rainy day, the
prospective buyers piled into a wagon with Holter, his wife, and a local guide and headed
out to inspect the timber first hand. The bad weather was not a detriment; in fact, the
elder Weyerhaeuser remarked "that lie lilced to buy timber when it was raining and sell it
on a day when the sun was shining." Within a few days, Ilumbird and Edward Rutledge,

another well-known lumberman, came to Sandpoint to look over the prospects at the mill.
Apparently the business looked like a good investment (Holter 1941: 2).

Incorporation of Elurnbird L ~ ~ m b Company
er
Back in St. Paul, buyers and sellers met with an attorney on December 3, 1900, to work
out details of the sale. After agreeing on a sale price of$190,000, Weyerhaeuser and
I-Iumbird offered A. M. Holter and W. E. Cullen a choice of either cash or stock in.the
new company. Cullen toolc the cash option and tlolter, remembering his difficulties as an
absentee owner, postponed his decision until he lcnew who would be managing the
operations. Once he learned that John Humbird's son, Thomas J. Hnmbird, would be
moving to Sandpoint to manage the mill operations, Holter toolc the stock option (Holter
1941: 2-3).
Three days after this meeting, on December 6, 1900, Humbird Lumber Company
incorporated under the laws of the state of Washington. The original capital investment
of $500,000 was divided into 5,000 shares of stoclc, each worth $100. Four sharellolders
(John A. Humbird, Fredericlc Weyerhaeuser, F. C. A. Denlunann, and A. M. I-Iolter) held
1,000 shares each; Edward Rutledge held 999 shares; and George S. Long held one. The
new company had its first stockholder meeting a week after incorporation. At that time,
they elected trustees (all of the stoclcholders but Holter); adopted bylaws; and, most
importantly, approved the purchase of Sand Point Lumber Co. (The date on the deed of
sale for the mill and some associated lands is February 12, 1901.) On January 7, 1901,
the stockholders elected the officers. The list held no surprises: John A. Humbird,
president; Fredericlc Weyerhaeuser, vice president; Edward Rutledge, secretary; John A.
Humbird, treasurer; and Thoinas J. Flumbird, general manager (Bonner County Deed
Record, Book 4:238-239; Humbird ca. 1947: 6-7; Humbird Ltimber Co. 1900).
The appointment of Thomas J. Humbird to be general manager of the new lumber
company elevated a second generation ofI3umbirds in the timber business. He had
worked for more than seventeen years for the White River Lumber Company in Mason,
Wisconsin, a mill owned and run by his father, John A. Humbird, and associates
including Frederick Weyerhaeuser. T. J. I-Iumbird had started in the company store there,
working his way up to managing the store before beginning to take over more of the
sawmill operations. By 1900, he was familiar with many aspects of the lumber business.
After several decades of living there, he was also well established in Mason, where he
and his family recently had built a large new home. He later recalled the decision to
move him to the new operations in Idaho. At a meeting wit11 Weyerhaeuser in St. Paul,
the older man told him about his recent trip to Idaho where he and John Humbird had
bought Sand Point Lumber Co., followed by the organization of the new Humbird
Lumber Co. "I told . . . [your father] that I wanted you to go out and manage this
company, that we had bought it for you? Weyerhaeuser said. He then continued, "You
will malce a great many mistakes. Your father does and I do. Everyone who
accomplished anything does, but try not to malce the same mistalce twice. I know you can
manage this company and I want you to go out there and do it." During negotiations,
Weyerhaeuser offered to raise Humbird's salary from his current $2,833.33 per year to a

full $3,000. With the difference given in advance, there was $166.67 to cover moving
expenses (Humbird ca. 1939: 38-39,42,45,48; Humbird ca. 1947:4).
It is not known how T. J. Humbird felt about this promotion and move, but he did. as he
was told. Just a few weeks after his appointment, after celebrating the Christmas holiday
with his wife and children, he left home for the uilfamiliar territory of Sandpoint, Idaho,
arriving to four feet of snow. The town was "in a feverish excitement" over the news that
the well-lcnown Weyerhaeuser syndicate had bought the local lumber mill. Thomas
Humbird set to work at his new job but within a few months, he suffered a nervous
brealcdown He spent the next two and a half years recuperating, first under a doctor's
care in Wisconsin, and later in Florida and ~heinainus,British Columbia, where another
&ily business, the Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company, was located. It is
apparent that he returned to Sandpoint from time to time, probably after he moved his
family to Spokane in 1901, but he turned active management of the sawmill over to A. E.
Riclcerd for this difficult period (Humbird ca. 1939: 52; Humbird ca. 1947: 4-5, 7; Silver
Blade, 15 December l900,3:1).
IIumbird Family and Rttsiness Associates

The men involved in the I-Iumbird Lumber Company included three generations of the
Humbird family, as well as multiple generations of their business associates. It was a
family business, where sons followed in their father's footsteps and took direction from
the older generation. The sons were expected to work hard and were not coddled with
easy jobs or exorbitant salaries. The family business also depended on its personal and
business ties with other lumber barons, especially the family of Frederick Weyerhaeuser,
as well as officials of the Northern Pacific Railroad.
The Humbird family included the following lumbermen:
0

John Alexander Humbird (1836-191 1). He initially followed his father, Jacob,
into railroad construction, worlcing with him in Brazil during the mid-1 860s. John
Humbird entered the lumber business in Wisconsin in 1875, first with Huinbird &
Company in Clayton, and later with the White River Lumber Company in Mason.
He and the other investors sold this last company in 1905, making a tidy profit.
He remained active in the lumber industry for the rest of his life. At the time of
his death in 1911, he was still president and treasurer of Humbird Lumber
Company, as well as president of Clearwater Timber Company and Victoria
Lumber & Manufacturing Company (Humbird ca. 1939: 11-13, 15,26-28,63;
I-Iumbird ca. 1947: 17; Humbird n.d.: 10).
Thomas J. Humbird (1 865-1956). Although he was born in Brazil, Thomas
Humbird grew up in the lumber industry in Wisconsin. After graduating from
high school in 1882, he joined the staff at the White River Lumber Comvanv's
,
store in Mason, worlcing his way up to manager. He also became familiar with
the operations of the sawmill and toolc over the management from his father in

.

Figrrre 2. Thomas .J. Hnmbird (seated) with his son .loLn A. I-lnmbird and dasghter-in-law Hedvig
Pearson Hnmbird, ea. 1920. Photo conrtesy o f the Bonner Connty Historical Society Maseom
Collection.

1888. He remained there until he was appointed general manager of the newlyformed Humbird Lumber Company in December 1900. I-Ie remained manager of
that company until replaced by his own son in 1919. T. J. Humbird also served as
president of the company from 1911 until its dissolution in 1948. Like his father,
he served as an officer or board member for otl~ercompanies, including the
Weyerhaeuser Sales Company, Clearwater Timber Company, Potlatch Forests,
Inc., and Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company (Hidy et al. 1963: 93,662;
Numbird ca. 1939: 38-39,42,48).
John A. Humbird (1888-1963). As a child, John Numhird moved with his family
to Spoltane, Washington, in the spring of 1901, soon aRer his father took over as
manager of the Humbird Lumber Company in Sandpoint. Once he was old
enough, the younger I-Iumbird worlced in the lumber shipping department during
his summer vacations, with at least one summer (1907) loading railroadcars on
the night shift in ICootenai. He briefly attended Princeton University but soon
returned to the family's line of work in the lumber industry. Be worked as
assistant manager of I-Iumbird Lumber Company from 1911-1917 and then as
general manager from 1919-1923. During World War I, he served in the U.S.
Army where he rose fkom Lieutenant to Captain and earned numerous awards
from both the French and American military. He was appointed general manager
in 1923 for the Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company in Chemainus,

British Columbia, a position he held until his retirement in 1944 (Humbird 11.d.: 1 ;
T. J. Humbird ca. 1939: 57; Princeton University 1963: 14).
The Humbirds were business associates o f many proininent lumbermen over the years.
Those involved with Humbird Lumber Company included the legendary Frederick
Weyerhaeuser and two o f his sons, John Philip and Frederick E. Weyerl~aeuser.Other
multi-generational associates were Montana lumberman A. M. Holter and his son,
Norman B. Nolter, along with Northern Pacific land agent William 13. Phipps and his son,
Stephen C. Phipps (Humbird ca. 1947, ca. 1951).
Land Acquisitions

Around the turn o f the century, the pattern o f land ownership changed dramatically in
northern Idaho as vast tracts o f land in the federal domain were set aside for Forest
Reserves, transferred to state holdings, or moved inlo private ownership. From 19001909, an estimated one-third o f the timberlands in the Inland Nortl~westchanged
ownership. The major private land holder was the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
which had been granted more than 38 million acres o f public lands to encourage the
building ofthe transcontinental railroad as well as to help offsetthe tremendous costs o f
construction. This grant included alternate sections o f land on both sides o f the railroad
line, extending forty miles on either side ofthe tracks through Idaho. Mt~chsmaller
parcels left the public domain as settlers moved into the region and began filing under the
1862 Homestead Act for up to 160 acres. Others, many of them not even residents o f the
region, filed under the 1878 Timber andstone Act which allowed 160 acre claims when
the claimant affirmed that the timber and stone was intended solely for personal use and
not for speculation. There was rampant abuse under this act, especially by timber
companies which paid dummy entrymen to make the claims and then turn them over to
the corporations. Approximately 3.6 million acres nationwide had been claimed under
this act by 1900, and most d t h e profits went to large timber companies (Billington 1974:
608; Fahey 1985: 97).
While the purchase of Sand Point Lumber Company brought with it a small amount o f
timberland, Humbird Lumber Con~panyofficials recognized immediately that they
needed much more. They began negotiations with Northern Pacific Railroad and secured
just over 20,000 acres in early January 1901, paying more than $144,000. Most o f this
land was in the Priest River drainage. Two other large deals with the railroad lollowed in
1902-1903. The first included nearly 45,000 acres in the Hoodoo Valley and another
7,000 acres in the area around Naples and hfcArthur. The second purchase covered
nearly 60,000 acres in several townships covering much o f the area tributary to the Pack
River. The final major deal occurred in 1910 when the company purchased nearly 18,000
acres northeast o f Sandpoint in the Grouse, Gold, and Rapid L,igltning drainages. In
addition, the company bought just under 2,800 acres o f land in scattered small sales from
the railroad, along with a later purchase o f over 6,700 acres on the Upper Pack River. In
all, nearly 75 percent o f Humbird holdings came from the Northern Pacific Railroad
(Humbird ca. 1947: 62-64).

Table 1. Harmbird Lirmber Company Purchases from Northern Pacific Railroad

Acres

Price

20,018
$144,133.05
52,321
$148,324.50
59,309
$197,197.53
17,899
$300,000.00
2,785
$9,596.55
6.719
$90,000.00
159,051
$889,251.63
(Source: Humbird ca. 1947: 62-64.)

Av. PriceIAcre
$7.20
$2.83
$3.32
$16.76
$3.44
$13.40
$5.60

Date of Deed
1-7-1901
7-22-1902
10-5-1903
7-11-1910
Various
After 1916

John A. Humbird had a profitable business relationship with the Northern Pacific
Railroad. William If. Phipps, land commissioner for the railroad, had been one of
Humbird's business partners for many years. Humbird had hired Phipps in 1872 to serve
as land commissioner for what became the Cl~icago,St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
Railway Company, and Phipps held this position until he moved to the Northern Pacific
in 1893. The two men also were associated in the Cumberland Land Company during the
late 1800s, buying white pine tracts in Minnesota. Following ihe organization of the
Victoria Lumber & Manufacturing Company in 1889, Phipps became a stoclcholder and
officer for many years. In addition to these business relationships, the two men were
"warm personal fiiends" (Humbird ca. 1939: 11-12, 17-18,30; Humbird ca. 1947: 62;
Humbird ca. 1951: unnxnnbered page on Wm. If. Phipps).
Despite the warm friendship, thetwo men were not above hard bargaining. During
negotiations for tile 60,000 acres of lands tributary to the Paclc River, they got hung up
over mineral rights. Deeds from the railroad typically retained mineral rights for the
seller, a fact well-known to I-Iumbird and his associates. I-Ie claimed, however, that he
had not been told of this exclusion at the beginning of the bargaining. After consulting
with Frederick Weyerhaeuser, I-Iumbird continued to object because they had found
through experience that such a reservation made it more difficult to resell the lands once
logging was finished. Ile went on, "We are now and have been spending so much money
on mills and improvements for tlie manufacture of this timber that we do not at this late
date want to give it up and do not feel that you ought to insist npon the reservation, but if
you do insist upon it, we feel that your company ought to at least pay half the taxes."
Plxipps took up Humbird's concerns with C. S. Mellen, President of Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, in March 1902, but he was c~nableto get the mineral clause removed.
More than a year later, Phipps tried to put pressure on Humbird officials to close the deal,
but it toolc until October 1903 to finalize the sale (Phipps 1902a-c, 1903a-b).
Up to 1910, John A. Humbird and Predericlc Weyerhaeuser had been the company's
negotiators with Northern Pacific. That year, however, Thomas J. Ifnmbird brokered his
first deal with the railroad. Dover Lumber Company had obtained considerable acreage
in the mountains northeast of Sandpoint, mixed in with the checkerboard of Northern
Pacific holdings. T. J. Humbird suggested that Ilumbird Lumber should try to buy these
railroad lands, a move that both older men approved. The younger I-Iurnbird also wanted

to push the railroad to throw in enough steel for a logging railroad, along with an
agreement to buy ties from the company. This seemed excessive to the others and they
advised against it, but they let the younger manager see what he could do. After a month
of negotiations in St. Paul, T. J. Numbird emerged triumphant with an agreement to
purchase twenty-eight sections of land. In addition to the land, be obtained the means to
log it: enough steel rails, switches, etc. for twenty-five miles of logging railroad, for a
rent of $100/mile; permission to connect the logging railroad with the main line at
Kootenai; permission to run logging trains on the main tracks between Kootenai and
Sandpoint for $llinile/train; and rental of logging flat cars at fifty cents per day. A
further bonus was the agreement that the raiiroad would bay a minimum of 150,000 ties
and a maximum of 300,000 ties every year for ten years, with the price negotiated
annually. This purchase suddenly put Humbird Lulnber Company at an advantage over
Dover Lu~nberCompany in the area northeast of Sandpoint, and the two companies
eventually traded some lands to bloclc up larger areas for each (Humbird ca. 1947:14-16).
The company obtained other lands, in smaller parcels, from individual land owners. In
addition, it bought the rights to the timber, excepting the land, from a number of people.
Humbird officials initially were slow to pick up these claims since they had set a price
limit for white pine of $1 per thousand board feet, wcll below what the owners could sell
to others. After T. J. I-lumbird had recovered his health and returned to work at the mill
in Sandpoint ca. 1903, he decided to pay the aslcing price to help build up the company's
timber inventory. The other company officers approved and the offer rose to $3 per
thousand board feet; the price covered not only white pine but also cedar poles, mixed
species, and the land itself (Humbird ca. 1947: 8, 61).
Humbird Lumber Company also purchased the timber from state lands. In one state sale
in 1907, T. J. Humbird and F. A. Blaclcwell, owner oEPanhandle Lumber Company in
Spirit Lalce, devised a strategy ahead of time whereby both companies ended up with
much of the timber they wanted. During the sale, the representative from each of these
two companies bid on every tract of timber offered based on the company's independent
timber cruise. Unless a third company joined the bidding, I-Iumbird and Blackwell did
not raise bids against each other. At the end of the sale, they divided the timber up so
that each company got the tracts that were tributary to its mill; this enabled Humbird to
obtain the timber on 2,837 acres of state lands. There was a twenty-year time limit for
cutting this timber without forfeit, however. In 1920, Humbird Lumber Company
decided to buy the state lands under some of its purchases, for $10 per acre, to retain
rights to the timber (Humbird ca. 1947: 12,62).

Nunlbird Lumber Company, 1901-1909: A Time of Expansion
The newly organized I-Iumbird Lumber Company arrived in northern Idaho on the eve of
the regional boom in lumber production. The first decade of the twentieth century saw
production statewide increase thirteen-fold, from 56 million board feet in 1899 to 728
million board feet in 1911. There was a rush to buy timberland, open new mills, and get
products onto the national market. As the industry expanded during this period, Humbird
also grew at a rapid pace. The company bought more than 150,000 acres of forests;
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-$252,513.01
$60,000
1933
$1 60,000
425,539.77
1934
432,265.29
$430,000
1935
-$641.29
$800,000
$600,000
-$13,306.71
1936
$500,000
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$39,427.03
$34,960.35
$350,000
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$200,000
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$17,689.94
$4,680.54
$200,000
1940
-$14,296.03
1941
$200,000
$3,826.50
$200,000
1942
-01943
-$34,015.10
1944
4540,646.35
-0(Source: Humbird Lumber Company ca. 1937; Annual Reports).
Conclusion
Humbird Lumber Company in Sandpoint exemplified large lumber companies in the
Inland Nortl~westduring the early twentieth century. It was founded and run by
experienced tunlbermen from the upper Midwest who were attracted to the region by its
vast stands of white pine and other virgin timber. Biith the Humbird and Weyerhaeuser
families were well-financed and well-connected, which enabled Humbird Lumber to
acquire thousands of acres of timber lands, rebuild after disastrous fires, and continue in
business during difficult times. As was typical of the lumber industry of the time,
Humbird Lumber was not designed to be a never-ending operation using sustainable yield
practices in its forests. Instead, under the management of T. J. I-lumbird, the company cut
the timber and then sold the underlying lands. As the white pine was depleted or became
difficult to reach, and market conditions turned bad, Humbird Lumber terminated its
operations and shut down its three sawmills. When T. J. Humbird analyzed the situation
in the late 1920s, this was the expedient thing to do since he believed that the company
had run its course. The closnre not only stopped the financial losses but also ensured
greater profits for the stoclcholders. And this, after all, was a primary purpose of the
company.
Today there is little left to see at the once-bustling mill site. The huge buildings are gone,
marlced only by bits of foundations and remnants of building materials. The lake, once
filled with logs from Sandpoint to Kootenai, is empty and waves lap at the foundations.
The myriad sounds of the mill, from immigrant voices to the din of a steam engine, are
quiet. The foundations and associated archaeological site are all that remains of
the town for three decades.
Sandpoint's largest lumber mill, an industry that s~~stained
Indeed, they are all that is left of an entire era when trees were tall and sawmills dotted
the shores of the lake and river.

APPENDIX B
1939 METZKER MAP

